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Judicial Deference to Inconsistent Agency
Statutory Interpretations
Yehonatan Givati and Matthew C. Stephenson
ABSTRACT
Although administrative law doctrine requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable stat-
utory interpretation, the doctrine is unclear as to whether an agency gets less deference when
it changes its own prior interpretation. We formally analyze how judicial deference to revised
agency interpretations affects the ideological content of agencies’ interpretations. We ﬁnd a
nonmonotonic relationship between judicial deference to inconsistent agency interpretations
and interpretive extremism. This relationship arises because as courts become less deferential
to revised interpretations, the initial agency ﬁnds it more attractive to promulgate a moderate
interpretation that will not be revised. However, the less deferential the courts, the more
extreme this moderate interpretation becomes. Normatively, our results suggest that an in-
terest in responsiveness of interpretive policy to the preferences of the incumbent leadership
favors deference to revised interpretations, whereas an interest in ideological moderation
favors a somewhat less deferential posture to interpretive revisions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Federal agencies in the United States have a great deal of ﬂexibility in
interpreting the statutes that they administer. Although an agency may
not contravene clear statutory directives, a reviewing court is supposed
to defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute,
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even if the court believes that a different interpretation is superior. Put
another way, the reviewing court’s obligation is not to ascertain the best
point estimate of statutory meaning but rather to deﬁne the bounds of
a policy space from which the agency can select its preferred interpre-
tation (Elliott 2005; Stephenson and Vermeule 2009). But what if the
agency changes its interpretive position? Should courts be any less def-
erential to an agency interpretation that differs substantially from the
agency’s own prior interpretation, if the new interpretation would have
been upheld as reasonable if it had been adopted in the ﬁrst instance?
Current doctrine is less clear regarding the answer to this question.
This article considers one aspect of this issue: whether, or under what
conditions, reducing the degree of judicial deference to an inconsistent
agency interpretation will lead an agency’s interpretation to be more
aggressive (that is, closer to the preferred position of the incumbent
leadership) or more moderate (that is, closer to the midpoint between
the ideal interpretations of the incumbent party and the opposition
party). We consider both the agency’s initial interpretive choice—when
the agency is writing on a clean slate, with no prior agency interpre-
tation—and the decision of the agency at a later time, when it is under
the control of a different administrationwithdifferentpolicypreferences.
Our most important ﬁnding is that there is a nonmonotonic relationship
between the degree of judicial deference to revised agency interpretations
and the aggressiveness of the agency’s initial interpretation. When courts
are very likely to defer to a revised interpretation or are very likely to
reject a revised interpretation, the agency’s initial interpretation will
strongly favor the interests of the incumbent administration, to the det-
riment of the party that is not in power. When the courts take a more
intermediate approach—sometimes upholding revised interpretations
but sometimes rejecting them—the agency’s initial interpretation is more
likely to be ideologically moderate.
The reason for this ﬁnding is as follows: although the incumbent
party would like to secure the most favorable interpretation possible, it
would also like to lock in its interpretation, thereby reducing the like-
lihood of future reversal. One way for the agency to protect itself from
reversal is to issue a more moderate interpretation, so that a future
administration does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to bear the costs of revising
it. If courts are generally unwilling to accept revised agency interpre-
tations, however, the incumbent has little incentive to be moderate, be-
cause even an extreme interpretation is protected by the courts from
administrative revision. Likewise, if the courts are very deferential toJUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO INCONSISTENT AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS / 87
revised interpretations, the incumbent also has little incentive to be mod-
erate, because the concessions that would be needed to preclude a future
interpretive revision are too costly. The moderating strategy becomes
attractive to the incumbent only when the courts are somewhat less
deferential to inconsistent interpretations. In that case, the incumbent
can lock in its interpretation by making modest but meaningful con-
cessions on the substance.
The normative and doctrinal ramiﬁcations of this ﬁnding depend
crucially on the speciﬁcation of the social objective function. For ex-
ample, one might believe that the appropriate normative objective is to
maximize the correspondence between the agency’s interpretation and
the preferences of the incumbent administration, on the logic that the
incumbent’s preferences tend to track the preferences of a majority of
voters. If so, one would prefer that courts defer just as much to a revised
agency interpretation as to the original interpretation. On the other
hand, one might believe that the median voter’s ideal interpretation is
usually somewhere between the ideal interpretations of the two domi-
nant political parties. If so, a judiciary that is somewhat less deferential
to a revised agency interpretation may be normatively desirable, because
it can induce interpretive moderation under administrations of both par-
ties. In short, normative assessment of deference doctrine depends in
large part on whether it is more important to foster responsiveness to
the ideology of the party in power or to encourage moderation between
the views of the major political competitors.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief over-
view of extant legal doctrine and scholarly commentary on the question
of whether courts should be less deferential to an agency interpretation
that differs substantially from the agency’s own prior interpretation.
Section 3 develops a formal model that captures, in stylized form, how
the judicial approach to this issue may affect the aggressivenessofagency
interpretations, when the principal reason that an agency might wish to
revise its interpretation is a shift in the agency’s policy preferences. Sec-
tion 4 assesses how variation in judicial doctrine on interpretative in-
consistency affects agency behavior, and Section 5 considers the nor-
mative implications of these results. A brief conclusion follows.
2. AGENCY INTERPRETIVE INCONSISTENCY: DOCTRINE AND COMMENTARY
The starting point for any discussion of judicial deference to federal
administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations is the Supreme Court’s88 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
seminal decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (467
U.S. 837 [1984]). The Chevron decision held that a reviewing court
should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute that
the agency administers, even if the court would have interpreted the
statute differently. However, the courts have sent mixed signals as to
whether this strong form of deference applies in the same way when the
agency’s interpretation, although reasonable, differs from the agency’s
own prior interpretation. Chevron itself involved the EnvironmentalPro-
tection Agency’s reversal of its earlier position on the meaning of the
term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. secs. 7502–
7503 [1977]), and the Chevron opinion indicated that a change in the
agency’s interpretive position is irrelevant to the appropriate level of
judicial deference. Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens’ opinion for the
Court emphasized that an “initial agency interpretation is not instantly
carved in stone,” since interpretive ﬂexibility is an important aspect of
agency authority (Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. at 863). However, only a few years later, in Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca (480 U.S. 421 [1987]), the Court
(in an opinion also authored by Justice Stevens) declared that an “agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conﬂicts with the agency’s
earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a
consistently held view” (480 U.S. at 446 [note 30]).
The tension between the positions taken in the Chevron decision and
in the nearly contemporaneous Cardoza-Fonseca decision caused a great
deal of uncertainty about whether interpretive inconsistency mattered
under the Chevron framework. In Rust v. Sullivan (500 U.S. 173 [1991]),
the Supreme Court seemed to come down squarely on the side of the
original Chevron position: the Rust decision declared that an agency
gets Chevron deference even if it reverses an earlier interpretation, em-
phasizing that Chevron itself involved just such a reversal (500 U.S. at
186). However, dicta in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines (501 U.S. 680
[1991]), decided the same term as Rust, declared that “the case for
judicial deference is less compelling with respect to agency positions that
are inconsistent with previously held views” (501 U.S. at 698), and in
Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala (508 U.S. 402 [1993]), the Court
cited Cardoza-Fonseca for the proposition that “the consistency of an
agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due”
(508 U.S. at 417). The most recent word from the Supreme Court on
this issue is National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand
X Internet Services (545 U.S. 967 [2005]). Brand X reafﬁrmed the ir-JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO INCONSISTENT AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS / 89
relevance of agency inconsistency, declaring that such inconsistency “is
not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the
Chevron framework” (545 U.S. at 981). However, the Court’s history
of inconsistency on this issue would give a savvy litigator reason to
question whether an agency interpretation that reversed a prior inter-
pretation would receive the same degree of deference as a more long-
standing interpretation.
1
In addition to these conﬂicting signals regarding the relevance of
interpretive inconsistency under the Chevron framework, the Court’s
holding in United States v. Mead Corporation (533 U.S. 218 [2001])
made clear that some agency statutory interpretations—particularly
those that appear in less formal guidance documents or interpretive
statements, rather than rules or orders—would not be analyzed under
Chevron at all, but instead would be reviewed pursuant to the less def-
erential standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (323 U.S. 134
[1944]). Under Skidmore, a reviewing court is supposed to “respect” an
agency’s view, but the weight accorded to the agency’s interpretation
depends on a variety of factors, including “consistencywith[theagency’s
own] earlier and later pronouncements” (323 U.S. at 140). This suggests
that even if an agency does receive full Chevron deference for a changed
interpretation if that interpretation is issued in a rule making or a formal
adjudication, if the agency opts to issue the interpretation in a lessformal
context, the lack of consistency may result in less judicial deference. Just
how much this factor matters, however, remains unclear.
2 Relatedly,
some lower courts (most notably the D.C. circuit) have embraced a
doctrinal framework that allows agencies to announce certain statutory
interpretations in “interpretive rules” (adopted without cumbersome
notice-and-comment rule-making procedures) but requires any revision
1. Gossett (1997) reports that, notwithstanding the inconsistent rhetoric about whether
inconsistent agency interpretations are entitled to less deference, in practice federal appeals
courts do not seem to defer substantially less often to changed agency interpretations. If
accurate, this evidence suggests that the position advanced in cases like Chevron, Rust,
and Brand X better captures the approach taken by most courts than does the contrary
language in cases like Cardoza-Fonseca, Pauley, and Good Samaritan Hospital. Still, using
court decisions to measure the level of deference to revised agency interpretation may be
an imprecise method, since a lower level of deference may result in more moderate inter-
pretations that will not be brought before a court (Givati 2010).
2. In one of the few attempts to assess this issue systematically, Hickman and Krueger
(2007) report that although federal appeals court cases applying the Skidmore standard
consider agency inconsistency, and although they do sometimes appear less deferential to
inconsistent agency interpretations, agency consistency seems less important overall than
the other factors that Skidmore identiﬁes as relevant.90 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
to such interpretations to go through the full notice-and-comment pro-
cess.
3 For a certain subset of agency statutory interpretations, this makes
revision of a prior statutory interpretation more difﬁcult than the initial
decision to promulgate that interpretation.
Although the focus here is on judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations, it is worth observing that a similar issue arises in the
more general context of judicial review of agency decisions for arbi-
trariness. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (463 U.S. 29 [1983]), the Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that an agency’s decision to rescind
a policy should be reviewed more deferentially than a decision to pro-
mulgate a new policy. According to State Farm, both the decision to
promulgate a rule and the decision to rescind that rule are subject to a
similar form of deferential, but nonetheless searching, “hard-look” re-
view. State Farm, however, seemed to leave open the question of whether
an agency’s decision to change its earlier policy should be subject to
more rigorous scrutiny, and some lower courts expressly adopted that
position.
4 In its recent decision in Federal Communications Commission
v. Fox Television Stations (129 S.Ct. 1800 [2009]), the Supreme Court
rejected the position that a change in agency policy is per se a reason
for less deferential judicial review, but a close reading of Fox Television
suggests that, as in the case of inconsistent agency statutory interpre-
tations, the Court may have left itself room to review changed agency
policy more aggressively in some circumstances.
5 Although the contexts
are similar, for the sake of clarity and to avoid some additional com-
3. See, for example, Alaska Professional Hunters Association v. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (177 F.3d 1030 [D.C. Cir. 1999]) and Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C.
Arena, L.P. (117 F.3d 579 [D.C. Cir. 1997]).
4. See, for example, Ofﬁce of Communication of United Church of Christ v. Federal
Communications Commission (707 F.2d 1413, 1425 [D.C. Cir. 1983]), and National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People v. Federal Communications Commission
(682 F.2d 993, 998 [D.C. Cir. 1982]).
5. In particular, although Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Fox Television
declares that the statutory standard of review makes “no distinction . . . between initial
agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that action,” his opinion
also recognizes that there are some circumstances when an agency must “provide a more
detailed justiﬁcation than what would sufﬁce for a new policy createdona blankslate”—for
example, when the agency’s “new policy rests upon factual ﬁndings that contradict those
which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account” (129 S.Ct. at 1811). Justice Anthony Kennedy,
whose vote was necessary to secure the 5–4 majority in the case, also stressed in a separate
concurrence that a change in policy may sometimes entail additional explanatory burdens
(129 S.Ct. at 1822) (Justice Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO INCONSISTENT AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS / 91
plications that arise in the context of State Farm–style hard-look review,
we focus here on inconsistency in agency statutory interpretation, al-
though many of our main ﬁndings would likely carry over to the State
Farm context as well.
The question whether courts ought to defer less to agency statutory
interpretations that are inconsistent with the agency’s own prior inter-
pretations has provoked debate among administrative law scholars.
Many of these scholars conclude that the need for agencies to respond
ﬂexibly to changing circumstances militates in favor of deferring just as
much to revised agency interpretations as to initialagencyinterpretations
(Diver 1985; Sunstein 1990; Weaver 1992; Gossett 1997; Shuren 2001;
Dotan 2005). A powerful additional argument for this position invokes
the importance of political accountability: changes in an agency’s inter-
pretive position may reﬂect changes in the agency’s political priori-
ties—often triggered by a change in the presidential administration—and
courts should respect this legitimate rationale for policy change (Pierce
1988; Scalia 1989; Sunstein 1990; Gossett 1997). The principal coun-
tervailing consideration noted in the literature is the rule-of-law interest
in predictability and consistency in the meaning of statutes (Sunstein
1990; Merrill 1992; Murphy 2005). Another concern is that a policy-
motivated change in interpretation might reﬂect not a legitimate policy
disagreement but rather an unjustiﬁed political hostility to an earlier
regulatory program (Weaver 1992). For these reasons, some scholars
have suggested that courts should be less deferential to revised agency
interpretations (Sunstein 1990; Merrill 1992) or at least that courts
should impose special additional explanatory or procedural burdens on
agencies when such inconsistency occurs (Diver 1985; Sunstein 1990;
Merrill 1992; Weaver 1992). In a similar spirit, Murphy (2005) argues
that a revised interpretation should receive substantial deference only
when the agency’s initial interpretation was issued in a procedural con-
text that makes it difﬁcult to reverse.
Interestingly, in focusing on the trade-off between ﬂexibility values
and rule-of-law values, the extant literature has focused less on how the
expected level of judicial deference to changed agency administration
affects the content—in particular, the ideological slant—of agency in-
terpretations. Much of the literature implicitly seems to presume that
the content of an agency’s interpretive choices—in particular, the initial
choice—will look essentially the same, regardless of the judicial doctrine
on deference to revised interpretations. However, a rich cognate litera-
ture in political economy suggests that the substantivechoicesofagencies92 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
(or other political actors) may depend crucially on strategic calculations
regarding the insulation of their decisions from future reversal (Mc-
Cubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989, 1990; De Figuei-
redo 2002; Stephenson 2003; Givati 2010). The administrative law lit-
erature has similarly noted in other contexts howcurrentadministrations
may strive to insulate their decisions from future reversal (Beermann
2003; Mendelson 2003; O’Connell 2008). Perhaps, then, judicial doc-
trine on deference to inconsistent agency interpretations—which, after
all, affects agencies’ ability to insulate their policy choices from subse-
quent reversal—might have important and nonobvious effects on the
substantive content of these interpretations. We explore this issue using
the stylized formal model developed in the next section.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. Primitives
Consider a simple model with two periods, ; two strategic play- t  {1, 2}
ers—a conservative party (C) and a liberal party (L); and one nonstra-
tegic player, the judiciary. In each period, one of the two parties controls
the presidency and therefore controls the interpretive decisions of an
administrative agency charged with implementing some congressional
statute. (For simplicity, we take the content of the statute as ﬁxed and
exogenous.) The interpretation chosen in period t is . x   t
In the ﬁrst period, without loss of generality, the conservative party
is in power and can choose interpretation . In the second period, the x1
liberal party is in power. (In other words, the second period is deﬁned
as the point at which the liberal party takes power.)
6 The agency, once
under liberal control, must decide whether to revise its interpretation of
the statute; formally, the liberal administration chooses . If the liberal x2
agency does not revise the interpretation, then the ﬁrst-period interpre-
tation selected by the conservative administration applies in the second
period ( ). If the liberal agency does revise its interpretation by x p x 21
selecting some ( , then that interpretation, if upheld, prevails in the xx 21
second period. If the liberal agency chooses to revise the prevailing in-
terpretation, it also pays some ﬁxed cost , which k  (0, 1/[1d(1b)])
can be interpreted as including the procedural costs of issuing a new
6. For simplicity, we assume that the conservative party’s choice of does not affect x1
the likelihood or timing of a transition in power, an assumption that seems reasonable for
the vast majority of interpretive policy decisions.JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO INCONSISTENT AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS / 93
interpretation of the statute, the political cost of reopening a contentious
political issue, and the expected litigation costs of defending the revision
in court.
7
Deﬁne the interpretation that prevails in period t as . The con- ˜ x   t
servative party’s ideal interpretation is , and its utility in the ﬁrst x ≤ 0 C
period is . In the second period, the conservative ˜ u (x ) p Fx x F C1 1 C
party’s utility is if the liberal party does not revise ˜ u (x ) p Fx x F C2 2 C
the conservative parties’ interpretation, and it is ˜ u (x ) p Fx  C2 2
if the liberal party does revise the statutory interpretation, x Fbk C
where the parameter capturesthepossibilitythattheconservative b  [0, 1]
party may beneﬁt from the liberal agency’s diversion of resourcestorevision
of the prior conservative interpretation.
8 The liberal party’s ideal interpre-
tation is , and its policy utility in period t is . In ˜ x ≥ 1 u (x) p Fx x F LL tt L
the ﬁrst period, both parties discount the expected second-period payoff
by . This parameter reﬂects how much each party cares about d  [0, 1]
its future utility relative to its present utility, as well as how long each
party expects the current period to last.
The agency’s ﬁrst-period interpretative decision is subject to judicial
review. The judiciary, applying something like the Chevron doctrine,
upholds any . That is, the interval is the policy space x  [0, 1] [0, 1] 1
that the statutory ambiguity opens up for the agency; is the most x p 0 1
conservative interpretation that the court would uphold, whereas
is the most liberal interpretation that the court would uphold.
9 x p 1 1
In the second period, if the liberal agency does not revise the prevailing
interpretation, then there is no judicial review. If, however, the liberal
agency chooses a new interpretation of the statute, ( , that choice xx 21
is again subject to judicial review. In the second period, as in the ﬁrst,
the judiciary will invalidate any interpretive choice outside the [0, 1]
interval. Furthermore, the judiciary might be less deferential to incon-
7. The upper bound on k guarantees that there are values of the other parameters such
that the liberal agency will sometimes be willing to revise a previous interpretation.
8. Although we include, for completeness, the term in the conservative party’s utility bk
function, our main qualitative results are unaffected by b, so long as b is not too large.
We also note that our interpretation of k and b suggests the possibility ofevenmorecomplex
strategic behavior, in which the conservative and liberal administrations both have to select
which among a large set of possible issues they will choose to address. We defer these
complications to future research.
9. If the judiciary were to reject the agency’s ﬁrst-period interpretation, the court would
select some alternative interpretation . In our model, this never occurs in x p q  [0, 1] 1
equilibrium, because the conservative agency is always weakly better off selecting some
. x  [0, 1] 194 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
sistent agency interpretations. We model this by assuming that, even if
the liberal agency selects some , nonetheless if ( ,t h e r e x  [0, 1] xx 22 1
is some probability, , that the judiciary will reject the agency’s a  [0, 1]
new interpretation. If the judiciary does so, the ﬁrst-periodinterpretation
prevails in the second period .
10 ˜ (x p x ) 21
The parameter a therefore captures the effective legal doctrine re-
garding judicial deference to revised administrative interpretations.
11
Greater values of a indicate a lower likelihood that the judiciary will
uphold an agency interpretation that is inconsistent with the agency’s
prior views. If , then inconsistency makes no difference whatso- a p 0
ever—as cases like Rust, Brand X, and Chevron itself suggest ought to
be the rule. A value of would represent the (unrealistic) extreme a p 1
case in which the agency’s initial interpretation is indeed “carved in
stone” and cannot be revised by the agency, absent congressional amend-
ment of the statute. Values of a between zero and one indicate an in-
termediate position, such as that suggested by cases like Cardoza-
Fonseca and Good Samaritan Hospital, as well as the Skidmore
standard: inconsistency increases the chances that the reviewing court
will reject the agency’s interpretation, but it does not guarantee it.
Our principal analysis assumes that a is constant—that is, the prob-
10. We are agnostic (at least for purposes of this article) as to judicial motivations in
reviewing agency interpretations of statutes, a topic on which there is a great deal of debate
(Cohen and Spitzer 1994, 1996; Revesz 1997; Cross and Tiller 1998; Stephenson 2004;
Miles and Sunstein 2006; Richards, Smith, and Kritzer 2006; Smith 2007). That said, we
do assume that whatever the judges’ underlying motivations, in practice they behave as if
there is a deﬁned “zone of discretion” from which the agency may select an initial inter-
pretation. This assumption entails some loss of generality, insofar as it excludes the pos-
sibility, discussed in other theoretical work, that each agency’s effective zone of discretion
may vary depending on the correspondence between judicial and agency preferences (Spiller
1992; Cohen and Spitzer 1994, 1996; Stephenson 2006b). Nonetheless, we think it is
reasonable, at least as a ﬁrst cut, to model the judiciary as a consistent and faithful applier
of a standard deference doctrine, such that the discretionary zone is constant. This as-
sumption can and should be relaxed in future work. We also note that we assume that,
whatever the judges’ underlying motivations, the acceptable range of interpretations is
constant across both periods. This is obviously a simpliﬁcation; indeed, one way that the
incumbent party in the ﬁrst period might try to insulate its interpretive decisions is by
appointing judges who would reject revisions on the merits. We bracket this possibility, as
we bracket the possibility that the legislature might amend the statute, to simplify the
exposition, in order to focus on other dynamics.
11. Our assumption that nondeference to changed interpretations can be modeled as a
probability of rejecting an interpretation that falls within the discretionary zone can be
thought of either as reﬂecting the unpredictable views of individual judges with respect to
whether revised interpretations are entitled to deference or as reﬂecting heterogeneityacross
the population of potential (randomly assigned) judges with respect to this issue.JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO INCONSISTENT AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS / 95
ability of the court rejecting a revised interpretation does not depend on
the ideological content of that interpretation. It is plausible, however,
that a court might be more likely to reject an agency interpretation that
represents a substantial change from the prior interpretation than to
reject a more marginal interpretive revision. That alternative assumption
would imply that a is an increasing function of . That alter- Fx x F 21
native assumption, however, adds substantial complexity to the analysis;
therefore, to build intuition, the main text focuses on the case where a
is constant. We show in Appendix A that all the main qualitative results
of our analysis hold in the case where a is an increasing function of
, provided that one is willing to make simple and, in our view, Fx x F 21
substantively reasonable assumptions about the functional form of
. a(Fx x F) 21
3.2. Equilibrium
We ﬁnd the equilibrium of the game by backward induction. For sim-
plicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that and x p 0 C
. (If either party had more extreme preferences—that is, if x p 1 x ! L C
or , then that party would always suffer some additional utility 0 x 1 1 L
loss even if it achieved its most-favored judicially acceptable interpre-
tation. This would affect that party’s overall utility level, but not its
equilibrium strategy.) In the second period, if the liberal agency decides
to incur the cost k and revise the interpretation that was chosen in the
ﬁrst period ( ), the liberal agency would choose whatever new inter- x1
pretation ( ) maximizes its expected second-period utility. That is, the x2
liberal agency chooses to maximize x2
period2 EU (revise) p (1a)(1 x )a(1x )k.( 1 ) L2 1
From this, it follows immediately that a liberal agency that chooses to
revise the interpretation of the statute would choose . So, the x p 1 2
liberal agency’s expected second-period utility from attempting to revise
the interpretation of the statute is . If, on the other hand, a(1x )k 1
the liberal agency chooses to accept the prevailing ﬁrst-period interpre-
tation without attempting any revision, then its second-period utility is
as follows:
period2 U (accept) p (1x ). (2) L1
The liberal agency will choose to revise the existing statutory inter-
pretation only if the expected second-period utility resulting from doing
so is positive. This calculation will take into account both the likely
result—whether the judiciary upholds the new interpretation—and the96 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
cost, k, of attempting an interpretive revision. Formally, the liberal
agency will promulgate an alternative interpretation of the statute if and
only if expression (1) is greater than expression (2). That is, the liberal
agency will attempt to revise the interpretation of the statute if and only
if
k T x ! 1 { x . (3) 1 () 1a
The value can be interpreted as a threshold value: it is the most
T x
conservative ﬁrst-period interpretation that would not trigger an at-
tempted reversal by the liberal agency in the second period.
Now consider the conservative agency’s choice. The conservative
agency can lock in its interpretation for both periods if it chooses a ﬁrst-
period interpretation , because, as we know from expression (3),
T x ≥ x 1
the liberal agency would not attempt to revise an interpretation in that
range. The conservative agency’s utility from locking in interpretation
for both periods is x1
U (lock in) p (1d)x . (4) C1
This expression is decreasing in , so the conservative agency’s most- x1
preferred in the range is . This is intuitive: is sufﬁ-
TT T xx  [x ,1 ] xx 11
ciently moderate that the liberal agency would accept it in the second
period, and the conservative agency has no reason to make additional
concessions by choosing a more liberal interpretation.
If the conservative agency were to choose a ﬁrst-period interpretation
, then the liberal agency would attempt a second-period reversal.
T x ! x 1
Accordingly, the conservative agency’s expected utility from this more
risky interpretive choice is
EU (risky) p (1da)x d(1a)dbk. (5) C1
This expression is also decreasing in , which implies that if the con- x1
servative agency were to choose an , it would choose .
T x ! xx p 0 11
We have shown that the conservative agency’s optimal risky inter-
pretation is , and the optimal interpretation that the conservative x p 0 1
agency can lock in for both periods is . All that remains is to
T x p x 1
compare the expected utilities of these two approaches. Substituting
these optimal values into expressions (4) and (5) allows us to establish
the condition under which the conservative agency will (weakly) prefer
the lock-in approach to the risky approach. That condition is
d(1abk) T x ≤ . (6)
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Intuitively, if is close enough to the conservative agency’s ideal point
T x
( ), the conservative agency will choose over . Ex-
T x p 0 x p xx p 0 C 11
pression (6) implies that any interpretation that the conservative agency
is both willing and able to lock in for both periods must be weakly less
than one-half. (In addition, note that the more the conservative party
beneﬁts from the liberal agency’s effort cost—the greater the value of
b—the more likely it is that the conservative agency will prefer the risky
approach to the lock-in approach; if , then there is no
T bk ≥ (1a) x
sufﬁciently low for the conservative agency to pursue the lock-in ap-
proach.) For expositional convenience, we can substitute the expression
for from expression (3), to rewrite the condition in expression (6) as
T x
Z { (1a)(1 da)k[1d(1a)db] ≤ 0. (7)
The conservative agency’s optimal ﬁrst-period interpretation, , is x* 1
therefore
0i f Z 1 0 x* p . (8) T 1 {x if Z ≤ 0
The expected second-period decision depends on whether the con-
servative agency opts for the lock-in approach or the risky approach. If
the former, then the second-period interpretation is simply . If the
T x
latter, then the second-period interpretation is either 1 (if the judiciary
accepts the liberal agency’s revision) or 0 (if the judiciary rejects the new
interpretation on grounds of inconsistency). This means that in equilib-
rium the expected value of the interpretation that prevails, , is ˜ x2
1a if Z 1 0 ˜ () Ex p . (9) T 2 {x if Z ≤ 0
4. ANALYSIS
We are interested principally in how a, the probability that the judiciary
reverses an agency interpretation (which we will call “inconsistency doc-
trine”), affects the agency’s interpretive choice. Inconsistency doctrine
affects interpretive choice in two ways. First, if the conservative agency
chooses the lock-in approach, it follows from expression (3) that in-
consistency doctrine will affect how aggressive the lock-in interpretation
will be. Second, from expressions (7) and (8), it is apparent that incon-
sistency doctrine will inﬂuence the conservative agency’s decision
whether to lock in its interpretation or to take a riskier interpretive
approach that will provoke a future liberal agency to attempt reversal.
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agency’s interpretation if the agency opts for the lock-in approach, an
increase in the probability that the judiciary will reject an inconsistent
agency interpretation makes the optimal lock-in approach more con-
servative. Formally,
T xk
p  ! 0. (10) 2 a (1a)
The intuition here is straightforward. As the judiciary becomes less likely
to accept a revised interpretation, attempting such a revision becomes
less appealing to the liberal agency in the second period; if the judiciary
rejects the attempted revision, the liberal agency will have incurred the
cost k for no beneﬁt. Therefore, the conservative agency does not need
to concede as much in the ﬁrst period to lock in its interpretation—it
can adopt a more aggressively conservative interpretation without pro-
voking the liberal agency to attempt reversal.
On the second point, regarding the conservative agency’s choice of
interpretative strategy, the lock-in approach becomes more appealing as
the probability that the judiciary rejects an inconsistent interpretation
increases. Formally,
Z
p d2ad1dbk ≤ 0. (11)
a
The intuition for this follows immediately from the fact that increasing
the judiciary’s probability of rejecting an inconsistent agency interpre-
tation allows the conservative agency to lock in an even more aggressive
interpretation without risking reversal.
We have established that decreasing judicial deference to inconsistent
agency interpretations both increases the appeal of the lock-in approach
and makes the lock-in approach more aggressive. The lock-in approach,
however, is (weakly) less aggressive than the risky approach. Therefore,
decreasing judicial deference to inconsistent agency interpretations may
increase or decrease the aggressiveness of the conservative agency’s ﬁrst-
period interpretation.
To illustrate, consider the effect of a change in judicial doctrine from
to (where ). Let us further deﬁne as the value of
T aa a 1 aa low high high low
a for which the condition in expression (7) holds with equality (that is,
is the minimum value of a that induces the conservative agency to
T a
choose the lock-in approach). If the conservative agency adopts the lock-
in approach both before and after the change in a (that is, ),
T a 1 a low
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conservative interpretation in the ﬁrst period.
12Ifthe conservativeagency
adopts the risky approach both before and after the change (that is,
), the increase in a will make no difference to the conservative
T a ! a high
agency’s ﬁrst-period choice. If, however, the increase in a induces the
conservative agency to switch from the risky approach to the lock-in
approach (that is, ), then the increase in a will lead the
T a 1 a 1 a high low
conservative agency to adopt a less aggressive ﬁrst-period interpretation,
because the conservative agency’s most-preferred lock-in interpretation
is more liberal than its most-preferred risky interpretation.
This is the key positive implication of our analysis: the relationship
between the level of judicial hostility to inconsistent agency interpre-
tations (a) and the aggressiveness of the ﬁrst-period interpretation ( ) x* 1
is nonmonotonic. When the judiciary is as deferential to a revised in-
terpretation as to an initial interpretation ( ), the conservative a p 0
agency selects the most conservative permissible interpretation (x* p 1
), and the liberal agency always successfully replaces it with the most 0
liberal permissible interpretation ( ). As a increases from 0 to x* p 1 2
, the conservative agency continues to select the most conservative
T a
permissible interpretation ( ); the liberal agency continues to at- x* p 0 1
tempt to change the interpretation to the most liberal interpretation
permissible, but there is now a positive probability that the court will
reject that attempt (implying that with probability and x p 11 a 2
with probability a). Once , the conservative agency
T x p 0 a p a 2
switches from the risky approach to the lock-in approach, which leads
to a more moderate ﬁrst-period interpretation (x* p 1[k/(1a)] 1 1
); this interpretation persists in the second period as well, because the 0
liberal agency no longer ﬁnds it worthwhile to attempt reversal. Further
increases in a, however, allow the conservative agency to lock in more-
conservative interpretations. Once , the conservative agency a p 1k
again chooses , and this interpretation will stick in both periods. x* p 0 1
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1.
Although our main focus concerns changes in a, it is also interesting
to consider the impact of changes in k, the ﬁxed cost to the liberal agency
of attempting an interpretive revision. After all, as noted in Section 2,
a number of scholars and judicial opinions have suggested that the cor-
rect approach for dealing with revised agency interpretations is not to
reduce the probability of deferring to such revisions but rather to impose
12. This statement relies on the assumption that . a ! 1  k low100 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
Figure 1. The conservative agency’s statutory interpretation
additional explanatory or procedural costs on agencies when those agen-
cies want to change their prior interpretive position. It turns out that
the results for changes in k are qualitatively similar to the results shown
above for changes in a. Formally,
T x 1
p  ! 0 (12)
k 1a
and
Z
p [1d(1a)db] ! 0. (13)
k
This implies that as the ﬁxed cost to the agency of revising a previous
interpretive decision increases, the ﬁrst-period agency can lock in a more
aggressive interpretation, and the attractiveness of this lock-in strategy
to the ﬁrst-period agency increases as a result. This leads to an analogous
nonmonotonicity result: increasing the ﬁxed cost of revisiting a prior
agency interpretation may lead to a more moderate initial interpretation,
if this increase causes the ﬁrst-period agency to switch from the risky
approach to the lock-in approach; however, further increases in thisﬁxed
cost will cause the ﬁrst-period interpretation to become progressively
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5. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Section 4 considered, as a positive matter, how inconsistency doctrine
affects the ideological extremism of agency interpretations. What are
the normative implications, if any, of this analysis? A full normative
discussion would be a complex enterprise well beyond the scope of this
article. As a preliminary contribution to this larger endeavor,weconsider
two normative benchmarks: the welfare of the two political parties and
the welfare of a hypothetical median voter (whom we will refer to simply
as the “voter”).
5.1. Parties’ Welfare
Decreasing deference to revised agency interpretations always makes the
conservative agency better off.
13 What about the liberal agency? If the
conservative agency chooses the risky approach in the ﬁrst period, the
liberal agency will choose in the second period, giving the liberal x* p 1 2
agency the following total utility:
() EU risky p (1dak). (14) L
If, on the other hand, the conservative agency adopts the lock-in ap-
proach in the ﬁrst period setting , the liberal agency will not
T x* p x 1
alter this interpretation in the second period. This means that the liberal
agency’s total utility will be
(1d)k T () U lock in p (1d)(1 x ) p . (15) L 1a
Note that the liberal agency’s expected utility from the conservative
agency’s choice of the risky approach and the lock-in approach both
decrease as the judiciary becomes less deferential to revised agency in-
terpretations (that is, as a increases). However, this does not mean that
decreasing deference to revised agency interpretations always decreases
the liberal agency’s utility. To see this formally, deﬁne
TT ˜ a p a 
.
14 For any , we can deﬁne such that
     TT T ˜ k[(1 db)/d] a  [a , a ] a 1 a
the liberal agency would prefer any to , although
     T a  [a , a ] aa 1
.
15 This result is illustrated in Figure 2.
  a
In Figure 2, we see two functions. The linear function represents the
13. This follows from the fact that and EU (risky) p d(1  a)  dbkU (lock in) p CC
are both increasing in a, and the conservative agency always (1  d)[1 k/(1  a)]
chooses the higher of the two.
14. The value is deﬁned such that . See Appendix B.
TT T ˜˜ a EU (risky,a ) p U (lock in,a ) LL
15. The value is deﬁned such that . Formally,
           a EU (risky, a) p U (lockin, a ) a p LL
. See Appendix B.
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Figure 2. The liberal agency’s expected utility
liberal agency’s utility when the conservative agency chooses the risky
approach (expression [14]). The curve represents the liberal agency’s
utility when the conservative agency chooses the lock-in approach (ex-
pression [15]). The liberal agency’s actual expected utility (represented
by the bold line in Figure 2) is the linear function for and the
T a ! a
curve for , since at the conservative agency shifts from the risky
TT a ≥ aa
approach to the lock-in approach. It is clear from Figure 2 that the
liberal party’s expected utility is higher at than at .
     T a  [a , a ] a
Intuitively, the conservative and liberal agencies have zero-sum pref-
erences on the interpretation of the statute. At , the conservative
T a
agency moves from the risky approach to the lock-in approach, but its
utility from both approaches is equal. However, moving to the lock-in
approach increases the liberal agency’s utility, since it does not have to
bear the cost of revising the conservative agency’s interpretation (k).
Thus, the liberal agency would beneﬁt from a decrease in the deference
to revised agency interpretations if (1) this decrease results in a shift
from the risky approach to the lock-in approach, and (2) the savings
resulting from avoiding the cost of revising the conservative agency’s
interpretation are greater than the decrease in utility from a more con-
servative interpretation. This analysis shows that decreasing the defer-
ence to revised agency interpretations could be a Pareto improvement
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5.2. Median Voter Welfare
That a moderate reduction in deference to revised agency interpretations
can improve the welfare even of the party out of power in the ﬁrst period
may be normatively signiﬁcant, but perhaps what would beneﬁt the
political parties is less important than what would beneﬁt the citizenry.
We therefore consider an alternative normative benchmark: the welfare
of the median voter in the electorate. Median voter welfare is problem-
atic as a normative standard, both because of the fact that the ideal
policy of the median voter may not be the policy that maximizes ag-
gregate social welfare (Stiglitz 2000), and because the majoritarianism
implicit in catering to the median voter may be insufﬁciently sensitive
to minority interests.
16 Also, for multidimensional issues there may not
be a single median voter, nor indeed any coherent way to describe what
the “majority prefers” (Arrow 1951; Riker 1982; Shepsle 1992). None-
theless, there are many situations in which the notion of accountability
to electoral majorities is both conceptually coherent and normatively
relevant, and under certain plausible assumptions,themajority-preferred
policy may at least roughly approximate the welfare-maximizing policy.
Furthermore, much administrative law doctrine proceeds on the as-
sumption that responsiveness to electoral majorities is an important (al-
though not necessarily the only) normative objective. For these reasons,
we explore how inconsistency doctrine might affect median voter wel-
fare. Formally, we deﬁne the voter’s ideal point in the ﬁrst period as
, and her ideal point in the second period as . For simplicity, we xx v1 v2
assume that the voter has the same discount factor, d, as the political
parties. The voter’s welfare is therefore
˜˜ FF FF U p  x x d x x , (16) Vv 11 v22
where is the interpretation that prevails in period t. ˜ xt
We explore two simpliﬁed conjectures about the relationship between
the voter’s ideal interpretation and the interpretation favored by the
party currently in power. According to one interpretation, the voter’s
ideal point is equal to the ideal point of the incumbent party (x p 0 vl
and ). The assumption here is that the conservative party controls x p 1 v2
the agency in the ﬁrst period because the voter in the ﬁrst period has
conservative preferences. The liberal party will take over when the
16. For these and other reasons, much economic analysis of legal rules uses aggregate
social welfare, rather than majoritarianism, as the principal normative criterion (Kaplow
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voter’s preferences have shifted in a liberal direction. Under this as-
sumption, the voter’s expected utility is
da if Z 1 0 EU p . (17) TT v {x d(1x )i f Z ≤ 0
It is apparent from expression (17) that the voter in this case is best off
if the judiciary always accepts a revised interpretation ( ).
17 That a p 0
is intuitive, because the voter is assumed to want whichever party is
currently in power to implement its most-preferred interpretation. A
judicial doctrine of maximizes the responsiveness of agency in- a p 0
terpretations to the views of the incumbent administration,whichiswhat
the voter would want if the incumbent’s views reliably track the voter’s
own.
However, we might reasonably supposethattheadministration’sideal
point does not perfectly track the voter’s ideal point. Indeed, it is plau-
sible that a great deal of the difference between the preferred interpre-
tations of liberal and conservative administrations is not due to shifts
in voter preferences on that particular interpretive issue but rather is
due to the inﬂuence of ideological extremistsorparochialinterestgroups,
or perhaps to the leadership’s own policy agenda. This is especially likely
because the voter does not elect each agency head independently but
rather elects a single president with a bundle of policy positions (Berry
and Gersen 2008). According to this view, the voter’s ideal interpretation
is likely to lie somewhere in between the ideal interpretations of the two
parties (Stephenson 2008). For simplicity, let us suppose that the voter’s
ideal interpretation in both periods is midway between the ideal inter-
pretations of the liberal and conservative parties—that is, x p x p v1 v2
. In this case, the voter’s utility if the conservative agency adopts the 1/2
lock-in approach is
1 T U (lockin) p (1d) x . (18) v FF 2
The voter’s expected utility if the conservative agency adopts the risky
approach is
1
() () EU risky p  1d . (19) () v 2
It follows that the voter is weakly better off if the conservative agency
chooses a lock-in approach. The reason is that, in this case, the voter is
indifferent between the liberal and conservative parties’ most-favored
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interpretative approaches; the risky approach guarantees an extreme
interpretation in both periods, which the voter dislikes. The lock-in ap-
proach, on the other hand, guarantees a more moderate interpretation
in both periods. Therefore, the voter would always prefer to any
T a
. Furthermore, if , the voter’s expected utility is decreasing
TT a ! aa ≥ a
in a. This follows from the fact that is decreasing in a and that
T x
for any . Therefore, when the voter’s ideal interpretation
TT x ≤ 1/2 a ≥ a
is at the midpoint between the conservative and liberal parties’ ideal
interpretations, the voter would most prefer that the judiciary reject a
changed agency interpretation with probability , because this judicial
T a
doctrine maximizes the moderation of the agency’s interpretationinboth
periods.
Both of the preceding normative analyses are clearly unrealistic, even
if one restricts the inquiry to the median voter welfare. The former case
supposes that the incumbent’s ideal interpretation is perfectly correlated
with the median voter’s ideal interpretation, whereas the latter case sup-
poses both that the incumbent’s ideal interpretation is uncorrelated with
the voter’s ideal interpretation and that the voter’s ideal is midway be-
tween that of the two political parties. However, these simple polar cases
illustrate the considerations that would inform a more nuanced and
realistic analysis, in which the median voter’s ideal point is somewhere
between the midpoint and the incumbent’s ideal point. The tighter the
correlation between voter preferences and the preferences of the incum-
bent party, the more the voter would prefer that courts defer to revised
agency interpretations, because this approach maximizes interpretive re-
sponsiveness to the incumbent party’s ideology. However, when agencies
are likely to be more ideologically extreme than the median voter, some
degree of judicial hostility to revised agency interpretations becomes
more attractive. In our model, this is not because the voter has some
intrinsic interest in interpretive consistency—although that might be a
real consideration in some circumstances (Stephenson 2006a)—but
rather because a reduction in deference tochangedagencyinterpretations
might induce greater interpretive moderation. Normative analysis must
be attentive to how this aspect of judicial doctrine affects the trade-off
between responsiveness and moderation in agency interpretation.
6. CONCLUSION
Modern administrative law doctrine has struggled with the question of
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on an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute when the
agency’s interpretation differs from the agency’s own prior construction
of the same statutory provision. The appropriate resolution of this
thorny doctrinal problem must take into account a number of factors
beyond the scope of this article, including the need to respondtochanged
circumstances and the rule-of-law interest in administrative consistency.
Nonetheless, any complete analysis must alsoconsiderhowinconsistency
doctrine affects the expected substantive ideological content of agency
statutory interpretations. Our analysis has demonstrated that this re-
lationship is more subtle and complicated than it might initially appear.
Most importantly, there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the
probability that a court will accept a revised interpretation and the ideo-
logical extremism of the original interpretation. This occurs because the
ﬁrst agency to interpret a statute must choose between two approaches:
it can take a risky approach, advancing an extreme interpretation that
it can anticipate its political opponents will try to undo as soon as they
take power, or it can “lock in” an interpretation that is sufﬁciently
moderate that its political opponents would not bother trying to revise
it, given the inherent costs of making such an attempt. When courts are
less deferential to revised interpretations, the lock-in approach becomes
more attractive because the original agency can secure an even more
favorable interpretation without fear of attempted reversal. So, although
decreasing deference to revised interpretations can sometimes make the
original interpretation more extreme, such a decrease can make the orig-
inal interpretation more moderate if it induces the initialagencytoswitch
from the risky approach to the lock-in approach.
The normative ramiﬁcations of this positive observation depend cru-
cially on the social objective function. If the goal is to increase the
responsiveness of interpretive choices to the party currently in
power—by the logic that electoral victory signiﬁes representativeness of
citizen preferences—then one would prefer that judicial deference to
revised agency interpretations be no different than judicial deference to
initial agency interpretations. If, however, one believes that political par-
ties’ interpretive preferences tend to be extreme relative to a majority
of the electorate—that is, if the variance in the ideal points of political
leaders over time tends to be much larger than the variance in the ideal
point of the median voter over time—or if one is interested in advancing
the joint welfare of the party in power and the party out of power, then
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what greater ﬁxed costs to an agency of revising a previous interpre-
tation, can be welfare enhancing.
APPENDIX A
The analysis in the main text assumes that the judiciary’s probability of
rejecting the liberal agency’s second-period interpretation is zero if
and a positive constant, a,i f ( . Here, we extend the analysis x p xx x 21 2 1
to consider the (arguably more realistic) setting in which the probability
that the judiciary rejects the liberal agency’s interpretation depends on
how different the new interpretation ( ) is from the original one ( ). xx 21
In other words, here we assume that a is an increasing function of
. Fx x F 21
Solving this extension is quite difﬁcult—and produces indeterminate
results—unless one imposes additional functional form assumptions on
. Here, we assume that the function is linear: a(Fx x F) a(Fx  21 2
, where . (Because the liberal agency would never x F) p g(x x ) g ≥ 0 12 1
adopt an in equilibrium, we can express the distance between x ! x 21
and simply as rather than as .) In this formulation, xx x x Fx x F 2 1 21 21
the coefﬁcient g captures the degree to which a ﬁxed level of inconsis-
tency increases the probability of judicial reversal. Thus, in this exten-
sion, g is conceptually analogous to the a parameter in the original
analysis.
In the second period, if the liberal agency chooses to accept the pre-
vailing ﬁrst-period interpretation without attempting any revision, then
its second-period utility is
period2 U (accept) p (1x ). (A1) L1
If, on the other hand, the liberal agency decides in the second period
to incur the cost k (where we now assume that ) and revise the k ≤ 1/2
interpretation that was chosen in the ﬁrst period ( ), its expected utility x1
is
period2 EU (revise) p [1g(x x )](1 x ) L2 1 2 (A2)
g(x x )(1 x )k. 21 1
The liberal agency would choose to maximize its expected utility. x2
The ﬁrst order condition of expression (A2) with respect to yields x2
1
x p x  . (A3) 21 2g
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ambiguity opens up for the agency. From expression (A3), one can see
that for any , the liberal agency will choose in the second g ≤ 1/2 x p 1 2
period, because any more liberal interpretation would be outside of the
permissible policy space.
The liberal agency will choose to revise the existing statutory inter-
pretation only if the expected second-period utility from doing so is
positive—that is, only if expression (A2) is greater than expression (A1).
If, in expression (A3), we get , then we can substitute expression x ! 1 2
(A3) into expression (A2). Doing so yields the result that the liberal
agency will attempt to revise the interpretation of the statute if and only
if
1
gk ≤ .( A 4 )
4
Intuitively, if the cost k of revising the interpretation is low, and if g
is also low (implying a high likelihood that the judiciary will uphold a
new agency interpretation), the agency will revise the interpretation that
was chosen in the ﬁrst period. Note that this condition does not depend
on : for any chosen in the ﬁrst period, if inequality (A4) holds, then xx 11
the liberal agency will choose an that is greater than by , xx 1/2g 21
whereas if inequality (A4) does not hold, then the liberal agency will
not attempt to revise the ﬁrst-period interpretation.Therefore,regardless
of whether inequality (A4) holds, the conservative agency will choose
, because this will maximize its utility in either case. x p 0 1
So far, we have analyzed the case where expression (A3) yields
. Since we have shown that in this case, we know that x ! 1 x p 0 21
in expression (A3) only when . Thus, when , the x ! 1 g 1 1/2 g 1 1/2 2
conservative agency will choose . x p 0 1
Now let us turn to the case where . In this case, expression g ≤ 1/2
(A3) implies that the liberal agency will choose (theagencycannot x p 1 2
choose , since it is outside the policy space ). So, if the liberal x 1 1 [0,1] 2
agency decides to revise the interpretation that was chosen in the ﬁrst
period ( ), we can substitute into expression (A2) to derive the xx p 1 12
liberal agency’s expected utility in the second period. Doing so yields
period2 2 EU (revise) p g(1x ) k. (A5) L1
The liberal agency will revise the existing statutoryinterpretationonly
if the expected second-period utility from doing so is positive—that is,
only if expression (A5) is greater than expression (A1). Solving this
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that the liberal agency will attempt to revise the ﬁrst-period interpre-
tation if and only if
 2g1 14gk
T x ! { x . (A6) 1 2g
Thus, the value is the most conservative ﬁrst-period interpretation
T x
that would not trigger an attempted reversal by the liberal agency in the
second period.
Now consider the conservative agency’s choice. The conservative
agency can lock in its interpretation for both periods if it chooses
. Its total utility in that case is
T x p x 1
T U (lock in) p (1d)x . (A7) C
If the conservative agency were to choose a ﬁrst-period interpretation
, the liberal agency would attempt a second-period reversal by
T x ! x 1
setting . Accordingly, the conservative agency would choose x p 1 2
, because there is no advantage to choosing any . The
T x p 0 x  (0,x ) 1 1
conservative agency’s expected utility from this more risky choice is
EU (risky) p d(1g)dbk. (A8) C
The conservative agency will (weakly) prefer the lock-in approach to
the risky approach if
d(1gbk) T x ≤ . (A9)
1d
Intuitively, if x
T is close enough to the conservative agency’s ideal point
( ), the conservative agency will choose over . If we
T x p 0 x p xx p 0 C 11
deﬁne , we can deﬁne the conservative
T Z p x [d(1gbk)/(1d)]
agency’s optimal ﬁrst-period interpretation, , as follows: x* 1
0i f Z 1 0 x* p . (A10) T 1 {x if Z ≤ 0
An increase in the probability that the judiciary will reject an incon-
sistent agency interpretation makes the optimal lock-in approach more
conservative. Formally,
 T 14gk(12gk) x
p ! 0. (A11) 2 g 2g 14gk
Recall, in interpreting expression (A10), that, in this case, both g and
k are less than 1/2.
In contrast to the basic model presented in the main text, here Z is
not monotonically decreasing in g, which complicates the analysis.How-110 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 40 (1) / JANUARY 2011
ever, the same dynamics apply, and the qualitative results continue to
hold. For example, suppose that , , and . In this case, k p .5 d p .95 b p 0
we can deﬁne as the value of g for which ; for these parameters,
T g Z p 0
. The conservative agency adopts the risky approach and sets
T g p .42
when . It adopts the lock-in approach and sets
T T x* p 0 g ! g x* p x 1 1
when . However, because , the relationship be-
TT g  [g ,1 / 2 ] x /g ! 0
tween the level of judicial hostility to inconsistent agency interpretations
(g) and the aggressiveness of the ﬁrst-period interpretation ( ) is non- x* 1
monotonic, as illustrated in Figure 1 (only now, as g increases above
, the point at which the conservative agency reverts to setting
T g x* p 1
is ). 0 g p 1/2
Thus, although the analysis is considerably more complicated, the
main qualitative results of our model continue to hold when we assume
, rather than assuming that a is constant for all a(Fx x F) p g(x x ) 21 21
. This does not mean that these results will hold for any function x p x 21
in which the probability of judicial reversal is an increasing function of
; we leave that inquiry into the generality of our results tofuture Fx x F 21
research. Nonetheless, the extension in this appendix demonstrates that
the intuition underlying our results is robust to a larger set of assump-
tions about how courts react to agency interpretive inconsistency.
APPENDIX B
At , the conservative agency’s utility from the risky approach and that
T a
from the lock-in approach are equal. Therefore, using expression (7),
we get
(1d)k T p 1da dbk. (B1) T 1a
The liberal agency’s utility from the conservative agency choosing
the lock-in approach is deﬁned in expression (15). We can use (B1) to
deﬁne this utility at a
T:
(1d)k TT U (lockin, a ) pp (1da dbk). (B2) L T 1a
Now, we would like to ﬁnd such that the liberal agency’s utility from
T ˜ a
the conservative agency’s choice of the risky approach when is
T ˜ a p a
equal to the liberal agency’s utility from the conservative agency’s choice
of the lock-in approach when (that is,
TT ˜ a p a U [risky, a ] p L
). Therefore, using expressions (14) and (B2):
T U [lock in, a ] LJUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO INCONSISTENT AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS / 111
TT ˜ (1da k) p (1da dbk).
or
(1db) TT ˜ a p a k . (B3)
d
At , the liberal agency’s utility from the conservative
  TT ˜ a  [a , a ]
agency choosing the risky approach is
   EU (risky, a ) p (1da k). (B4) L
We would like to ﬁnd such that the liberal agency’s utility from
   a
the conservative agency’s choice of the lock-in approach when
   a p a
is equal to the liberal agency’s utility from the conservative agency’s
choice of the risky approach when (that is,
   a p a U [risky, a ] p L
). Accordingly,
   U [lock in, a ] L
(1d)k   (1da k) p    1a
or
(1d)k    a p 1 . (B5)   1da k
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